Saturday, February 26, 2011

http://www.faThe Foundations of Mindfulness- Satipatthana Sutta -Translated by Nyanasatta Thera
Introduction

The philosophy of Buddhism is contained in the Four Noble Truths. [1]

The truth of suffering reveals that all forms of becoming, all the various elements of existence comprised in the "five aggregates" or groups of existence -- also called the "five categories which are the objects of clinging" (panc'upadana-kkhandha) -- are inseparable from suffering as long as they remain objects of grasping or clinging. All corporeality, all feelings and sensations, all perceptions, all mental formations and consciousness, being impermanent, are a source of suffering, are conditioned phenomena and hence not-self (anicca, dukkha, anatta). Ceaseless origination and dissolution best characterize the process of existence called life, for all elements of this flux of becoming continually arise from conditions created by us and then pass away, giving rise to new elements of being according to one's actions or kamma.

All suffering originates from craving, and our very existence is conditioned by craving, which is threefold: the craving for sense pleasures (kama-tanha), craving for continued and renewed existence (bhava-tanha), and craving for annihilation after death (vibhava-tanha). This is the truth of the origin of suffering.

The attainment of perfect happiness, the breaking of the chain of rebirths and suffering through the realization of Nibbana, is possible only through the utter extirpation of that threefold craving. This is the truth of suffering's cessation.

The methods of training for the liberation from all suffering are applied by following the Noble Eightfold Path of Right Understanding, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Exertion, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration of Mind. The Noble Eightfold Path consists of three types of training summed up in: virtuous conduct (sila), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna). This is the truth of the way that leads to the cessation of suffering.

The prevalence of suffering and absence of freedom and happiness is due to man's subjection to the three roots of all unskill and evil, and all unwholesome actions (akusalakamma), viz. lust, hatred and delusion (lobha, dosa, moha).

Virtuous conduct casts out lust. The calm of true concentration and mental culture conquers hatred. Wisdom or right understanding, also called direct knowledge resulting from meditation, dispels all delusion. All these three types of training are possible only through the cultivation of constant mindfulness (sati), which forms the seventh link of the Noble Eightfold Path. Mindfulness is called a controlling faculty (indriya) and a spiritual power (bala), and is also the first of the seven factors of enlightenment (satta bojjhanga).[2] Right Mindfulness (samma-sati) has to be present in every skilful or karmically wholesome thought moment (kusalacitta). It is the basis of all earnest endeavour (appamada) for liberation, and maintains in us the sense of urgency to strive for enlightenment or Nibbana.

The Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness, the Satipatthana Sutta, is the tenth discourse of the Middle Length Collection (Majjhima Nikaya) of the Discourses of the Enlightened One. It is this version which is translated in the present publication. There is another version of it, in the Collection of Long Discourses (Digha Nikaya No.22), which differs only by a detailed explanation of the Four Noble Truths.

The great importance of the Discourse on Mindfulness has never been lost to the Buddhists of the Theravada tradition. In Sri Lanka, even when the knowledge and practice of the Dhamma was at its lowest ebb through centuries of foreign domination, the Sinhala Buddhists never forgot the Satipatthana Sutta. Memorizing the Sutta has been an unfailing practice among the Buddhists, and even today in Sri Lanka there are large numbers who can recite the Sutta from memory. It is a common sight to see on full-moon days devotees who are observing the Eight Precepts, engaged in community recital of the Sutta. Buddhists are intent on hearing this Discourse even in the last moments of their lives; and at the bedside of a dying Buddhist either monks or laymen recite this venerated text.

In the private shrine room of a Buddhist home, the book of the Satipatthana Sutta is displayed prominently as an object of reverence. Monastery libraries of palm-leaf manuscripts have the Sutta bound in highly ornamented covers.

One such book with this Discourse written in Sinhala script on palm-leaf, has found its way from Sri Lanka as far as the State University Library of Bucharest in Rumania. This was disclosed while collecting material for the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, when an Esperantist correspondent gave us a list of a hundred books on Buddhism found in the Rumanian University Libraries.

Mindfulness of Breathing(Anapana-sati)

The subjects dealt with in the Satipatthana Sutta are corporeality, feeling, mind and mind objects, being the universe of right Buddhist contemplation for deliverance. A very prominent place in the Discourse is occupied by the discussion on mindfulness of breathing (anapana-sati). To make the present publication of greater practical value to the reader, an introductory exposition of the methods of practising that particular meditation will now be given.

Mindfulness of breathing takes the highest place among the various subjects of Buddhist meditation. It has been recommended and praised by the Enlightened One thus: "This concentration through mindfulness of breathing, when developed and practised much, is both peaceful and sublime, it is an unadulterated blissful abiding, and it banishes at once and stills evil unprofitable thoughts as soon as they arise." Though of such a high order, the initial stages of this meditation are well within the reach of a beginner though he be only a lay student of the Buddha-Dhamma. Both in the Discourse here translated, and in the 118th Discourse of the same Collection (the Majjhima Nikaya), which specifically deals with that meditation, the initial instructions for the practice are clearly laid down:

Herein, monks, a monk, having gone to the forest or the root of a tree or to an empty place, sits down with his legs crossed, keeps his body erect and his mindfulness alert. Ever mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out. Breathing in a long breath, he knows, "I am breathing in a long breath"; breathing out a long breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a long breath." Breathing in a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing in a short breath"; breathing out a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a short breath." "Experiencing the whole (breath) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Experiencing the whole (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself.

These are instructions given by the Enlightened One to the monks who, after their alms round, had the whole remaining day free for meditation. But what about the lay Buddhist who has a limited time to devote to this practice? Among the places described as fit for the practice of meditation, one is available to all: sunnagara, lit. "empty house," may mean any room in the house that has no occupant at that moment, and one may in the course of the twenty-four hours of the day find a room in one's house that is empty and undisturbed. Those who work all day and feel too tired in the evening for meditation may devote the early hours of the morning to the practice of mindfulness of breathing.

The other problem is the right posture for meditation. The full "lotus posture" of the yogi, the padmasana, as we see it in the Buddha statues, proves nowadays rather difficult to many, even to easterners. A youthful meditator, however, or even a middle-aged one, can well train himself in that posture in stages. He may, for instance, start with sitting on a low, broad chair or bed, bending only one leg and resting the other on the floor; and so, in gradual approximation, he may finally master that posture. There are also other easier postures of sitting with legs bent, for instance the half-lotus posture. It will be worth one's effort to train oneself in such postures; but if one finds them difficult and uncomfortable at the outset it will not be advisable to delay or disturb one's start with meditation proper on that account. One may allow a special time for sitting-practice, using it as best as one can for contemplation and reflection; but for the time being, the practice of meditation aiming at higher degrees of concentration may better be done in a posture that is comfortable. One may sit on a straight backed chair of a height that allows the legs to rest comfortably on the floor without strain. As soon however, as a cross-legged posture has become more comfortable, one should assume it for the practice of mindfulness of breathing, since it will allow one to sit in meditation for a longer time than is possible on a chair.

The meditator's body and mind should be alert but not tense. A place with a dimmed light will be profitable since it will help to exclude diverting attention to visible objects.

The right place, time and posture are very important and often essential for a successful meditative effort.

Though we have been breathing throughout our life, we have done so devoid of mindfulness, and hence, when we try to follow each breath attentively, we find that the Buddhist teachers of old were right when they compared the natural state of an uncontrolled mind to an untamed calf. Our minds have long been dissipated among visible data and other objects of the senses and of thought, and hence do not yield easily to attempts at mind-control.

Suppose a cowherd wanted to tame a wild calf: he would take it away from the cow and tie it up apart with a rope to a stout post. Then the calf might dash to and fro, but being unable to get away and tired after its effort, it would eventually lie down by the post. So too, when the meditator wants to tame his own mind that has long been reared on the enjoyment of sense objects, he should take it away from places where these sense objects abound, and tie the mind to the post of in-breaths and out-breaths with the rope of mindfulness. And though his mind may then dash to and fro when deprived of its liberty to roam among the sense objects, it will ultimately settle down when mindfulness is persistent and strong.

When practising mindfulness of breathing, attention should be focused at the tip of the nose or at the point of the upper lip immediately below where the current of air can be felt. The meditator's attention should not leave this "focusing point" from where the in-coming and out-going breaths can be easily felt and observed. The meditator may become aware of the breath's route through the body but he should not pay attention to it. At the beginning of the practice, the meditator should concentrate only on the in-breaths and out-breaths, and should not fall into any reflections about them. It is only at a later stage that he should apply himself to the arousing of knowledge and other states connected with the concentration.

In this brief introduction, only the first steps of the beginner can be discussed. For more information the student may refer to the English translation of the Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification, chap. VIII) by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, or to Mindfulness of Breathing by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, and to The Heart of Buddhist Meditation by Nyanaponika Thera. [3]

The lay Buddhist who undertakes this practice will first take the Three Refuges and the Five Precepts; he will review the reflections on the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, transmit thoughts of lovingkindness (metta) in all directions, recollect that this meditation will help him to reach the goal of deliverance through direct knowledge and mental calm; and only then should he start with the mindfulness of breathing proper, first by way of counting.[4]

Counting

The Buddhist teachers of old recommend that a beginner should start the practice by counting the breaths mentally. In doing so he should not stop short of five or go beyond ten or make any break in the series. By stopping short of five breaths his mind has not enough room for contemplation, and by going beyond ten his mind takes the number rather than the breaths for its objects, and any break in the series would upset the meditation.

When counting, the meditator should first count when the in-breath or the out-breath is completed, not when it begins. So taking the in-breath first, he counts mentally 'one' when that in-breath is complete, then he counts 'two' when the out-breath is complete, 'three' after the next in-breath, and so on up to ten, and then again from one to ten, and so he should continue.

After some practice in counting at the completion of a breath, breathing may becoming faster. The breaths, however, should not be made longer or shorter intentionally. The meditator has to be just mindful of their occurrence as they come and go. Now he may try counting 'one' when he begins to breathe in or breathe out, counting up to five or ten, and then again from one to five or ten. If one takes both the in-breath and out-breath as 'one', it is better to count only up to five.

Counting should be employed until one can dispense with it in following the sequence of breaths successively. Counting is merely a device to assist in excluding stray thoughts. It is, as it were, a guideline or railing for supporting mindfulness until it can do without such help. There may be those who will feel the counting more as a complication than a help, and they may well omit it, attending directly to the flow of the respiration by way of "connecting the successive breaths."

Connecting

After the counting has been discarded, the meditator should now continue his practice by way of connecting (anubandhana); that is, by following mindfully the in and out breaths without recourse to counting, and yet without a break in attentiveness. Here too, the breaths should not be followed beyond the nostrils where the respiratory air enters and leaves. The meditator must strive to be aware of the whole breath, in its entire duration and without missing one single phase, but his attention must not leave the place of contact, the nostrils, or that point of the upper lip where the current of air touches.

While following the in-breaths and out-breaths thus, they become fainter and fainter, and at times it is not easy to remain aware of that subtle sensation of touch caused by the respiration. Keener mindfulness is required to keep track of the breaths then. But if the meditator perseveres, one day he will feel a different sensation, a feeling of ease and happiness, and occasionally there appears before his mental eye something like a luminous star or a similar sign, which indicates that one approaches the stage of access concentration. Steadying the newly acquired sign, one may cultivate full mental absorption (jhana) or at least the preliminary concentration as a basis for practising insight.

The practice of mindfulness of breathing is meant for both mental calm and insight (samatha and vipassana). Direct knowledge being the object of Buddhist meditation, the concentration gained by the meditative practice should be used for the clear understanding of reality as manifest in oneself and in the entire range of one's experience.

Though penetrative insight leading to Nibbana is the ultimate object, progress in mindfulness and concentration will also bring many benefits in our daily lives. If we have become habituated to follow our breaths for a longer period of time and can exclude all (or almost all) intruding irrelevant thoughts, mindfulness, self-control and efficiency are sure to increase in all our activities. Just as our breathing, so also other processes of body and mind, will become clearer to us, and we shall come to know more of ourselves.

It has been said by the Buddha: "Mindfulness of breathing, developed and repeatedly practised, is of great fruit, of great advantage, for it fulfils the four foundations of mindfulness; the four foundations of mindfulness, developed and repeatedly practised, fulfil the seven enlightenment factors; the seven enlightenment factors, developed and repeatedly practised, fulfil clear-vision and deliverance." Clear vision and deliverance, or direct knowledge and the bliss of liberation, are the highest fruit of the application of mindfulness.

Footnotes from the Introduction

[1] An exhaustive exposition of the Four Noble Truths is found in The Word of The Buddha by Nyanatiloka Mahathera. See also Three Cardinal Discourses of the Buddha, transl. by Nanamoli Thera (BPS Wheel No. 17) and The Four Noble Truths by Francis Story (BPS Wheel No. 34/35).

[2] See Piyadassi Thera, The Seven Factors of Enlightenment (BPS Wheel No. 1).

[3] All published by the Buddhist Publication Society.

[4] On the Refuges and Precepts, see The Mirror of the Dhamma (BPS Wheel No. 54).



THE FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS

Satipatthana Sutta

Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was living among the Kurus, at Kammasadamma, a market town of the Kuru people. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhu thus: "Monks," and they replied to him, "Venerable Sir." The Blessed One spoke as follows:

This is the only way, monks, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the destruction of suffering and grief, for reaching the right path, for the attainment of Nibbana, namely, the four foundations of mindfulness. What are the four?

Herein (in this teaching) a monk lives contemplating the body in the body, [1] ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating feelings in feelings, ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness, [2] ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, [2] ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief.

I. THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE BODY

1. Mindfulness of Breathing

And how does a monk live contemplating the body in the body?

Herein, monks, a monk, having gone to the forest, to the foot of a tree or to an empty place, sits down with his legs crossed, keeps his body erect and his mindfulness alert. [3]

Ever mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out. Breathing in a long breath, he knows, "I am breathing in a long breath"; breathing out a long breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a long breath"; breathing in a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing in a short breath"; breathing out a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a short breath."

"Experiencing the whole (breath-) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Experiencing the whole (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself.

Just as a skilful turner or turner's apprentice, making a long turn, knows, "I am making a long turn," or making a short turn, knows, "I am making a short turn," just so the monk, breathing in a long breath, knows, "I am breathing in a long breath"; breathing out a long breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a long breath"; breathing in a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing in a short breath"; breathing out a short breath, he knows, "I am breathing out a short breath." "Experiencing the whole (breath-) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Experiencing the whole (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe in," thus he trains himself. "Calming the activity of the (breath-) body, I shall breathe out," thus he trains himself.

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body internally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body externally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body internally and externally. [4] He lives contemplating origination factors [5] in the body, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors [6] in the body, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors [7] in the body. Or his mindfulness is established with the thought: "The body exists," [8] to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, [9] and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating the body in the body.

2. The Postures of the Body

And further, monks, a monk knows, when he is going, "I am going"; he knows, when he is standing, "I am standing"; he knows, when he is sitting, "I am sitting"; he knows, when he is lying down, "I am lying down"; or just as his body is disposed so he knows it.

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body internally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body externally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in the body, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in the body, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in the body. [10] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought: "The body exists," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating the body in the body.

3. Mindfulness with Clear Comprehension

And further, monks, a monk, in going forward and back, applies clear comprehension; in looking straight on and looking away, he applies clear comprehension; in bending and in stretching, he applies clear comprehension; in wearing robes and carrying the bowl, he applies clear comprehension; in eating, drinking, chewing and savouring, he applies clear comprehension; in walking, in standing, in sitting, in falling asleep, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silence, he applies clear comprehension.

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body....

4. The Reflection on the Repulsiveness of the Body

And further, monks, a monk reflects on this very body enveloped by the skin and full of manifold impurity, from the soles up, and from the top of the head-hairs down, thinking thus: "There are in this body hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, marrow, kidney, heart, liver, midriff, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, gorge, faeces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, nasal mucus, synovial fluid, urine."

Just as if there were a double-mouthed provision bag full of various kinds of grain such as hill paddy, paddy, green gram, cow-peas, sesamum, and husked rice, and a man with sound eyes, having opened that bag, were to take stock of the contents thus: "This is hill paddy, this is paddy, this is green gram, this is cow-pea, this is sesamum, this is husked rice." Just so, monks, a monk reflects on this very body enveloped by the skin and full of manifold impurity, from the soles up, and from the top of the head-hairs down, thinking thus: "There are in this body hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, marrow, kidney, heart, liver, midriff, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, gorge, faeces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, nasal mucus, synovial fluid, urine."

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body....

5. The Reflection on the Material Elements

And further, monks, a monk reflects on this very body, however it be placed or disposed, by way of the material elements: "There are in this body the element of earth, the element of water, the element of fire, the element of wind." [11]

Just as if, monks, a clever cow-butcher or his apprentice, having slaughtered a cow and divided it into portions, should be sitting at the junction of four high roads, in the same way, a monk reflects on this very body, as it is placed or disposed, by way of the material elements: "There are in this body the elements of earth, water, fire, and wind."

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body....

6. The Nine Cemetery Contemplations

(1) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body dead one, two, or three days; swollen, blue and festering, thrown in the charnel ground, he then applies this perception to his own body thus: "Verily, also my own body is of the same nature; such it will become and will not escape it."

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body internally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body externally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination-factors in the body, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in the body, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution-factors in the body. Or his mindfulness is established with the thought: "The body exists," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating the body in the body.

(2) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground, being eaten by crows, hawks, vultures, dogs, jackals or by different kinds of worms, he then applies this perception to his own body thus: "Verily, also my own body is of the same nature; such it will become and will not escape it."

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body....

(3) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground and reduced to a skeleton with some flesh and blood attached to it, held together by the tendons....

(4) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground and reduced to a skeleton blood-besmeared and without flesh, held together by the tendons....

(5) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground and reduced to a skeleton without flesh and blood, held together by the tendons....

(6) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground and reduced to disconnected bones, scattered in all directions_here a bone of the hand, there a bone of the foot, a shin bone, a thigh bone, the pelvis, spine and skull....

(7) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground, reduced to bleached bones of conchlike colour....

(8) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground reduced to bones, more than a year-old, lying in a heap....

(9) And further, monks, as if a monk sees a body thrown in the charnel ground, reduced to bones gone rotten and become dust, he then applies this perception to his own body thus: "Verily, also my own body is of the same nature; such it will become and will not escape it."

Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body internally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body externally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in the body, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in the body, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in the body. Or his mindfulness is established with the thought: "The body exists," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating the body in the body.

II. THE CONTEMPLATION OF FEELING

And how, monks, does a monk live contemplating feelings in feelings?

Herein, monks, a monk when experiencing a pleasant feeling knows, "I experience a pleasant feeling"; when experiencing a painful feeling, he knows, "I experience a painful feeling"; when experiencing a neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling," he knows, "I experience a neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling." When experiencing a pleasant worldly feeling, he knows, "I experience a pleasant worldly feeling"; when experiencing a pleasant spiritual feeling, he knows, "I experience a pleasant spiritual feeling"; when experiencing a painful worldly feeling, he knows, "I experience a painful worldly feeling"; when experiencing a painful spiritual feeling, he knows, "I experience a painful spiritual feeling"; when experiencing a neither-pleasant-nor-painful worldly feeling, he knows, "I experience a neither-pleasant-nor-painful worldly feeling"; when experiencing a neither-pleasant-nor-painful spiritual feeling, he knows, "I experience a neither-pleasant-nor-painful spiritual feeling."

Thus he lives contemplating feelings in feelings internally, or he lives contemplating feelings in feelings externally, or he lives contemplating feelings in feelings internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in feelings, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in feelings, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in feelings. [12] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Feeling exists," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus, monks, a monk lives contemplating feelings in feelings.

III. THE CONTEMPLATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

And how, monks, does a monk live contemplating consciousness in consciousness?

Herein, monks, a monk knows the consciousness with lust, as with lust; the consciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with hate, as with hate; the consciousness without hate, as without hate; the consciousness with ignorance, as with ignorance; the consciousness without ignorance, as without ignorance; the shrunken state of consciousness, as the shrunken state; [13] the distracted state of consciousness, as the distracted state; [14] the developed state of consciousness as the developed state; [15] the undeveloped state of consciousness as the undeveloped state; [16] the state of consciousness with some other mental state superior to it, as the state with something mentally higher; [17] the state of consciousness with no other mental state superior to it, as the state with nothing mentally higher; [18] the concentrated state of consciousness, as the concentrated state; the unconcentrated state of consciousness, as the unconcentrated state; the freed state of consciousness, as the freed state; [19] and the unfreed state of consciousness as the unfreed state.

Thus he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness internally, or he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness externally, or he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in consciousness, or he lives contemplating dissolution-factors in consciousness, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in consciousness. [20] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Consciousness exists," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus, monks, a monk lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness.

IV. THE CONTEMPLATION OF MENTAL OBJECTS

1. The Five Hindrances

And how, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in mental objects?

Herein, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five hindrances.

How, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five hindrances?

Herein, monks, when sense-desire is present, a monk knows, "There is sense-desire in me," or when sense-desire is not present, he knows, "There is no sense-desire in me." He knows how the arising of the non-arisen sense-desire comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen sense-desire comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned sense-desire comes to be.

When anger is present, he knows, "There is anger in me," or when anger is not present, he knows, "There is no anger in me." He knows how the arising of the non-arisen anger comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen anger comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned anger comes to be.

When sloth and torpor are present, he knows, "There are sloth and torpor in me," or when sloth and torpor are not present, he knows, "There are no sloth and torpor in me." He knows how the arising of the non-arisen sloth and torpor comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen sloth and torpor comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned sloth and torpor comes to be.

When agitation and remorse are present, he knows, "There are agitation and remorse in me," or when agitation and remorse are not present, he knows, "There are no agitation and remorse in me." He knows how the arising of the non-arisen agitation and remorse comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen agitation and remorse comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned agitation and remorse comes to be.

When doubt is present, he knows, "There is doubt in me," or when doubt is not present, he knows, "There is no doubt in me." He knows how the arising of the non-arisen doubt comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen doubt comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned doubt comes to be.

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects externally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in mental objects. [21] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Mental objects exist," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five hindrances.

2. The Five Aggregates of Clinging

And further, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. [22]

How, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging?

Herein, monks, a monk thinks, "Thus is material form; thus is the arising of material form; and thus is the disappearance of material form. Thus is feeling; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the disappearance of feeling. Thus is perception; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is the disappearance of perception. Thus are formations; thus is the arising of formations; and thus is the disappearance of formations. Thus is consciousness; thus is the arising of consciousness; and thus is the disappearance of consciousness."

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects externally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in mental objects. [23] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Mental objects exist," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus also, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging.

3. The Six Internal and External Sense Bases

And further, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the six internal and the six external sense-bases.

How, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the six internal and the six external sense-bases?

Herein, monks, a monk knows the eye and visual forms and the fetter that arises dependent on both (the eye and forms); [24] he knows how the arising of the non-arisen fetter comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen fetter comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned fetter comes to be.

He knows the ear and sounds ... the nose and smells ... the tongue and flavours ... the body and tactual objects ... the mind and mental objects, and the fetter that arises dependent on both; he knows how the arising of the non-arisen fetter comes to be; he knows how the abandoning of the arisen fetter comes to be; and he knows how the non-arising in the future of the abandoned fetter comes to be.

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects externally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating dissolution factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution factors in mental objects. [25] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Mental objects exist," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the six internal and the six external sense-bases.

4. The Seven Factors of Enlightenment

And further, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the seven factors of enlightenment.

How, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the seven factors of enlightenment?

Herein, monks, when the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is present, the monk knows, "The enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is in me," or when the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of mindfulness comes to be; and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of mindfulness comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects is present, the monk knows, "The enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of the investigation of mental objects comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of energy is present, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of energy is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of energy is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of energy is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of energy comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of energy comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of joy is present, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of joy is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of joy is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of joy is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of joy comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of joy comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of tranquillity is present, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of tranquillity is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of tranquillity is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of tranquillity is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of tranquillity comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of tranquillity comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of concentration is present, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of concentration is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of concentration is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of concentration is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of concentration comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of concentration comes to be.

When the enlightenment-factor of equanimity is present, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of equanimity is in me"; when the enlightenment-factor of equanimity is absent, he knows, "The enlightenment-factor of equanimity is not in me"; and he knows how the arising of the non-arisen enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes to be, and how perfection in the development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes to be.

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects externally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination-factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating dissolution-factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating origination-and-dissolution-factors in mental objects. [26] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Mental objects exist," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the seven factors of enlightenment.

5. The Four Noble Truths

And further, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the four noble truths.

How, monks, does a monk live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the four noble truths?

Herein, monks, a monk knows, "This is suffering," according to reality; he knows, "This is the origin of suffering," according to reality; he knows, "This is the cessation of suffering," according to reality; he knows "This is the road leading to the cessation of suffering," according to reality.

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects externally, or he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects internally and externally. He lives contemplating origination-factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating dissolution-factors in mental objects, or he lives contemplating origination-and- dissolution-factors in mental objects. [27] Or his mindfulness is established with the thought, "Mental objects exist," to the extent necessary just for knowledge and mindfulness, and he lives detached, and clings to nothing in the world. Thus, monks, a monk lives contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the four noble truths.

* * *

Verily, monks, whosoever practises these four foundations of mindfulness in this manner for seven years, then one of these two fruits may be expected by him: highest knowledge (Arahantship) here and now, or if some remainder of clinging is yet present, the state of non-returning. [28]

O monks, let alone seven years. Should any person practise these four foundations of mindfulness in this manner for six years ... five years ... four years ... three years ... two years ... one year, then one of these two fruits may be expected by him: highest knowledge here and now, or if some remainder of clinging is yet present, the state of non-returning.

O monks, let alone a year. Should any person practise these four foundations of mindfulness in this manner for seven months ... six months ... five months ... four months ... three months ... two months ... a month ... half a month, then one of these two fruits may be expected by him: highest knowledge here and now, or if some remainder of clinging is yet present, the state of non-returning.

O monks, let alone half a month. Should any person practise these four foundations of mindfulness in this manner for a week, then one of these two fruits may be expected by him: highest knowledge here and now, or if some remainder of clinging is yet present, the state of non-returning.

Because of this it was said: "This is the only way, monks, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the destruction of suffering and grief, for reaching the right path, for the attainment of Nibbana, namely the four foundations of mindfulness."

Thus spoke the Blessed One. Satisfied, the monks approved of his words.

Satipatthana SuttaMajjhima Nikaya, Sutta No. 10



NOTES

[1] The repetition of the phrases 'contemplating the body in the body', 'feelings in feelings', etc. is meant to impress upon the meditator the importance of remaining aware whether, in the sustained attention directed upon a single chosen object, one is still keeping to it, and has not strayed into the field of another contemplation. For instance, when contemplating any bodily process, a meditator may unwittingly be side-tracked into a consideration of his feelings connected with that bodily process. He should then be clearly aware that he has left his original subject, and is engaged in the contemplation of feeling.

[2] Mind (Pali citta, also consciousness or vinnana) in this connection means the states of mind or units in the stream of mind of momentary duration. Mental objects, dhamma, are the mental contents or factors of consciousness making up the single states of mind.

[3] Literally, "setting up mindfulness in front."

[4] 'Internally': contemplating his own breathing; 'externally': contemplating another's breathing; 'internally and externally': contemplating one's own and another's breathing, alternately, with uninterrupted attention. In the beginning one pays attention to one's own breathing only, and it is only in advanced stages that for the sake of practising insight, one by inference at times pays attention also to another person's process of breathing.

[5] The origination factors (samudaya-dhamma), that is, the conditions of the origination of the breath-body; these are: the body in its entirety, nasal aperture and mind.

[6] The conditions of the dissolution of the breath-body are: the destruction of the body and of the nasal aperture, and the ceasing of mental activity.

[7] The contemplation of both, alternately.

[8] That is, only impersonal bodily processes exist, without a self, soul, spirit or abiding essence or substance. The corresponding phrase in the following contemplations should be understood accordingly.

[9] Detached from craving and wrong view.

[10] All contemplations of the body, excepting the preceding one, have as factors of origination: ignorance, craving, kamma, food, and the general characteristic of originating; the factors of dissolution are: disappearance of ignorance, craving, kamma, food, and the general characteristic of dissolving.

[11] The so-called 'elements' are the primary qualities of matter, explained by Buddhist tradition as solidity (earth), adhesion (water), caloricity (fire) and motion (wind or air).

[12] The factors of origination are here: ignorance, craving, kamma, and sense-impression, and the general characteristic of originating; the factors of dissolution are: the disappearance of the four, and the general characteristic of dissolving.

[13] This refers to a rigid and indolent state of mind.

[14] This refers to a restless mind.

[15] The consciousness of the meditative absorptions of the fine-corporeal and uncorporeal sphere (rupa-arupa-jhana).

[16] The ordinary consciousness of the sensuous state of existence (kamavacara).

[17] The consciousness of the sensuous state of existence, having other mental states superior to it.

[18] The consciousness of the fine-corporeal and the uncorporeal spheres, having no mundane mental state superior to it.

[19] Temporarily freed from the defilements either through the methodical practice of insight (vipassana) freeing from single evil states by force of their opposites, or through the meditative absorptions (jhana).

[20] The factors of origination consist here of ignorance, craving, kamma, body-and-mind (nama-rupa), and the general characteristic of originating; the factors of dissolution are: the disappearance of ignorance, etc., and the general characteristic of dissolving.

[21] The factors of origination are here the conditions which produce the hindrances, such as wrong reflection, etc., the factors of dissolution are the conditions which remove the hindrances, e.g. right reflection.

[22] These five groups or aggregates constitute the so-called personality. By making them objects of clinging, existence, in the form of repeated births and deaths, is perpetuated.

[23] The origination-and-dissolution factors of the five aggregates: for material form, the same as for the postures (Note 10); for feeling, the same as for the contemplation of feeling (Note 12); for perception and formations, the same as for feeling (Note 12); for consciousness, the same as for the contemplation of consciousness (Note 20).

[24] The usual enumeration of the ten principal fetters (samyojana), as given in the Discourse Collection (Sutta Pitaka), is as follows: (1) self-illusion, (2) skepticism, (3) attachment to rules and rituals, (4) sensual lust, (5) ill-will, (6) craving for fine-corporeal existence, (7) craving for incorporeal existence, (8) conceit, (9) restlessness, (10) ignorance.

[25] Origination factors of the ten physical sense-bases are ignorance, craving, kamma, food, and the general characteristic of originating; dissolution factors: the general characteristic of dissolving and the disappearance of ignorance, etc. The origination-and-dissolution factors of the mind-base are the same as those of feeling (Note 12).

[26] Just the conditions conducive to the origination and dissolution of the factors of enlightenment comprise the origination-and-dissolution factors here.

[27] The origination-and-dissolution factors of the truths should be understood as the arising and passing of suffering, craving, and the path; the truth of cessation is not to be included in this contemplation since it has neither origination nor dissolution.

[28] That is, the non-returning to the world of sensuality. This is the last stage before the attainment of the final goal of Arahantship.

Further Sources of Information

1. The Way of Mindfulness. Soma Thera. Third Edition, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.

2. The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. Nyanaponika Thera. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.

3. Visuddhimagga. The Path of Purification. Trans. by Bhikkhu Nanamoli. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.

4. Mindfulness of Breathing: Anapanasati. Bhikkhu Nanamoli. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.

5. Setting-up of Mindfulness (Mahasatipatthana-Sutta), Dialogues of the Buddha, trans. by Prof. T.W. Rhys Davids; third edition; P.T.S., 1951, Vol. II, pp.322-346.

6. Discourse on the Applications of Mindfulness (Satipatthana-Sutta), The Middle Length Sayings. No.10; trans. by I.B. Horner, P.T.S., Vol, I. pp.70-82.

7. The Book of Kindred Sayings, V., Samyutta Nikaya III, pp.119-168, P.T.S. 1956.

cebook.com/home.php?sk=group_156543811044650&view=doc&id=192552057443825

Sunday, February 20, 2011

When you practice zazen you should not try to attain anything. You should just sit in the complete calmness of your mind and not rely on anything. Just keep your body straight without leaning over or against something. To keep your body straight means not to rely on anything. In this way, physically and mentally, you will obtain complete calmness. But to rely on something or try to do something in zazen is dualistic and not complete calmness.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 113

If you want to study Zen, you should forget all your previous ideas and just practice zazen and see what kind of experience you have in your practice. That is naturalness.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition p. 99

Zazen practice is a direct expression of our true nature. Strictly speaking, for a human being, there is no other practice than this practice; there is no other way of life than this way of life.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 5

When you are practicing zazen, do not try to stop your thinking. Let it stop by itself. If something comes into your mind, let it come in, and let it go out. It will not stay long. When you try to stop your thinking, it means you are bothered by it. Do not be bothered by anything. It appears as if something comes from outside your mind, but actually it is only the waves of your mind, and if you are not bothered by the waves, gradually they will become calmer and calmer.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 17, 18

When you say, “whatever I do is Buddha nature, so it doesn’t matter what I do, and there is no need to practice zazen,” that is already a dualistic understanding of our everyday life. If it really does not matter, there is no need for you even to say so. As long as you are concerned about what you do, that is dualistic.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 26

For the beginner, practice without effort is not true practice. For the beginner, the practice needs great effort.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p.27

You become discouraged with your practice when your practice has been idealistic. You have some gaining idea in your practice, and it is not pure enough. It is when your practice is rather greedy that you become discouraged with it. So you should be grateful that you have a sign or warning signal to show you the weak point in your practice. At that time, forgetting all about your mistake and renewing your way, you can resume your original practice. This is a very important point.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 58

Another mistake will be to practice for the sake of the joy you find in it. Actually, when your practice is involved in a feeling of joy, it is not in very good shape either. Of course it is not poor practice, but compared to the true practice it is not so good. In Hinayana Buddhism, practice is classified in four ways. The best way is to just do it without having any joy in it, not even physical joy. This way is just to do it, forgetting your physical and mental feeling, forgetting all about yourself in your practice. This is the fourth stage, the highest stage. The next highest stage is to have just physical joy in your practice. At this stage you find some pleasure in practice, and you will practice because of the pleasure you find in it. In the second stage you have both mental and physical joy, or good feeling. These two middle stages are stages in which you practice zazen because you feel good in your practice. The first stage is when you have no thinking and no curiosity in your practice. These four stages also apply to Mahayana practice, and the highest is just to practice it.

Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind, Shunryu Suzuki, 40th anniversary edition, p. 59

Friday, February 11, 2011

Sutra of the Eight Realizations of Great Beings
(with Annotations)

Translated from Chinese by the Chung Tai Translation Committee

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page 1


Day and night, at all times,
Buddha’s disciples should
Mindfully recite and contemplate
The eight realizations of Great Beings.

The First Realization:
All the world is impermanent.
The earth is fragile and perilous.
The four great elements inhere in suffering and emptiness.
In the five skandhas there is no self.
All that arise, change, and perish,
Are illusive, unreal, and without a master.
Mind is the root of evil;
Body a reservoir of sin.
Thus observing and contemplating,
One gradually breaks free from birth and death.

The Second Realization:
Excessive desire is suffering.
Birth, death, and weariness in life
All originate from greed and desires.
Desiring less, being wu-wei,
Body and mind are at ease and free.

The Third Realization:
The mind is insatiable,
Always seeking, thirsty for more,
Thus increasing our sins.
Bodhisattvas renounce such conduct.
Always remember to follow the way,
Be content and at peace with poverty,
With wisdom as the sole vocation.

The Fourth Realization:
Indolence leads to degradation.
Always practice with diligence,
Vanquish all vexations,
Subdue the four maras,
And escape the prison of the skandhas.




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Sutra of the Eight Realizations of Great Beings
(with Annotations)

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page 2


The Fifth Realization:
Ignorance leads to birth and death.
Bodhisattvas are always mindful
To study and learn extensively,
To increase their wisdom
And perfect their eloquence,
So they can teach and enlighten all beings,
And impart great joy to all.

The Sixth Realization:
Poverty and hardship breed resentment,
Creating harm and discord.
Bodhisattvas practice dana,
Beholding the friendly and hostile equally;
They neither harbor grudges
Nor despise malicious people.

The Seventh Realization:
The five desires are perilous.
Even as laity, be not sullied by worldly pleasures;
Think frequently of the three robes,
The tiled bowl, and instruments of Dharma;
Aspire to the monastic life
And cultivate the Way with purity;
Let your actions be noble and sublime,
Showering compassion on all.

The Eighth Realization:
Birth and death are like a blazing fire
Plagued with endless afflictions and suffering.
Vow to cultivate the Mahayana mind,
To bring relief to all;
To take on infinite sufferings for sentient beings,
And lead all to supreme joy.

These are the eight realizations of Great Beings,
Buddhas and bodhisattvas.
They practice the Way with diligence,
Develop compassion, and cultivate wisdom.
They sail the ship of dharmakaya
To the shore of nirvana,
Returning again to samsara to liberate sentient beings.
With these eight principles,
They point out the Way,
So that all beings may awaken
To the sufferings of life and death,
Relinquish the five desires, and
Cultivate the mind on the noble path.
If Buddha’s disciples recite these eight realizations,
In thought after thought,
They will eradicate countless sins,
Advance on the bodhi path,
Promptly attain enlightenment,
Be forever freed from birth and death,
And always abide in joy.





Sutra of the Eight Realizations of Great Beings
(with Annotation)



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page 3


Annotation



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Sutra: : a Buddhist scripture, spoken by the Buddha or certified (to be true) by the Buddha. the “self” and life. From ignorance comes desires and hatred, which in turn lead to samsara.
Great Beings: Highly enlightened beings; beings with great virtue and deeds; bodhisattvas and Buddhas.
Mindfully: sincerely, with great concentration; whole-heartedly.
Eight Realizations: what one must achieve to become a Great Being such as Buddha.

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First Realization: the foundation of the eight realizations; the teaching of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and no-self.
Four great elements : earth (solid or dry matter), water (liquid or wet matter), wind (air or motion), and fire (heat or energy). They comprise all matter.
Inhere in suffering: all worldly things are impermanent, and prone to bring suffering.
Emptiness: without independent existence, consistency, or fixed characteristics.
Five skandhas: five aggregates—form, feeling, conception, volition, and consciousness. Ordinary beings take these aggregates to be the “self”.
No self: emptiness of independent, consistent self-identity. What we perceive as “self” is actually an illusive ego.
All that arise... : all composite things are conditional, always changing, and will perish. One should see beyond their appearance. There isn’t a master-controller.
Root of evil: all harmful actions come from deluded thoughts.
Reservoir of sin: the body is prone to suffering, a result of past transgressions.
Free from birth and death: to escape the endless rebirth cycle and attain nirvana.

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Birth, death: where there is birth there is death; both are suffering. The endless rebirth cycle (“samsara”) is a result of desires arising from delusion.
Wu-wei : free from forced effort (but not necessarily no-action), free from clinging and attachments, unconditioned, absolute. It also means inner peace obtained by having no desires, understanding that we are intrinsically complete and lacking nothing.

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Sin: misdeeds, actions that lead to harm and suffering.
Bodhisattva: one who vows to become a Buddha and, with infinite compassion, liberates countless sentient beings. Bodhi: enlightenment, to awaken. Sattva: sentient beings, beings with consciousness.
At peace with poverty: the bodhisattva is not distressed by physical hardship; true poverty is poverty of virtue, not material comfort.
Wisdom as sole vocation: “wisdom” means the understanding of truth. To acquire such wisdom is essential for the bodhisattva.




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Sutra of the Eight Realizations of Great Beings
(with Annotation)



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page 4


Annotation



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Indolence: sloth or laziness easily leads to moral misconducts.
Practice with diligence: to attain the Way requires diligent effort.
Vexations: klesas (pronounced “kleshas”)—greed, anger, and ignorance; the addictive mental states that vex the mind; causes of suffering; defilement of the mindy.
Four maras: maras are obstacles to cultivation. 1. Kleshas, 2. skandhas, 3. death, 4. deva-mara, the celestial evil tempter.
Prison: the skandhas are like a prison.

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Ignorance: : ignorance of the true nature of the “self” and life. From ignorance comes desires and hatred, which in turn lead to samsara.
Study and learn: bodhisattvas need to learn many ways of liberation in order to help wide groups of people.
Eloquence: ability to convey the teaching well and to answer difficult questions.

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Poverty and hardship: easily lead to resentment, which in turn may produce otherwise undue and uncalled-for bad karma with many people.
Dana: the practice of charity. One may practice the giving of material things, or donating organs, or the giving of Dharma wisdom, or the giving of comfort and encouragement.
Equal: bodhisattva understands all beings are fundamentally equal; they have no hatred towards evil or malicious people.
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Five desires: desire for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touch. Alternatively, desire for wealth, lust, fame, food, and sleep. They are harmful, not pleasurable.
Three robes …: traditionally Buddhist monks wear only three robes. Tiled bowl: monk’s begging bowl can be tiled or metal. Instruments: used in chanting or Buddhist services. These are symbols of monastic life.

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Mahayana: means great (maha) vehicle (yana). It is the path of bodhisattvas and Buddhas, who are devoted to the liberation of all beings. Mahayana mind: the bodhi mind, the enlightened mind, the Buddha nature within all of us.
Take on sufferings: a bodhisattva is willing to self-sacrifice for others. But a true sacrifice is to eliminate the ego and help others to eliminate the ego and attain enlightenment.
Sentient beings: all living beings with sentience, including devas (gods or heavenly beings), asuras (demi-gods), human beings, animals, hungry- ghosts, and hell-beings. Unlike Buddhas and bodhisattvas, they are all trapped in samsara.
Supreme joy: the joy of perfect enlightenment; the joy of nirvana.

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Dharmakaya: the Buddha has three bodies (kaya), dharma-kaya, the truth body, which is formless, unborn, our original nature; sambhogha-kaya, the bliss body, which can only be seen by great bodhisattvas; and nirmana-kaya, the transformation body, which is the historical Buddha seen by ordinary beings.
Samsara: means “birth-and-death,” referring to reincarnation, that is the endless cycle of birth-and-deaths. By extension it means this world of afflictions and suffering.
Nirvana: the state free from all suffering; ultimate bliss and tranquility.
Thought after thought: one deviant thought can lead to grave peril; one pure thought can eliminate great sin.
Bodhi path: the path to awakening, to becoming a Buddha. Therein lies the lasting joy.
Why Did Bodhidharma Go to the East?
Buddhism’s Struggle with the Mind in the World
If someone asks the meaning of Bodhidharma coming from the
West,
It is that the handle of a wooden ladle is long, and the
mountain torrents run deep;
If you want to know the boundless meaning of this,
Wait for the wind blowing in the pines to drown out the
sound of koto strings. [Koan 18, tr Heine]
This question—why did Bodhidharma come from the West?—is ubiquitous in
Chinese Ch’an Buddhist literature. Though some see it as an arbitrary question
intended merely as an opener to obscure puzzles, I think it represents a genuine
intellectual puzzle: Why did Bodhidharma come from the West—that is, from India?
Why couldn’t China with its rich literary and philosophical tradition have given rise
to Buddhism? We will approach that question, but I prefer to do so backwards. I
want to ask instead, “why was it so fortuitous for the development of Buddhist
philosophy that Bodhidharma went East? I will argue that by doing so he gave a
trajectory to Buddhist thought about the mind and knowledge that allows certain
issues that are obscure in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, despite their centrality to the
Buddhist critique of Indian orthodoxy, to come into sharper relief, and hence to
complete a project begun, but not completable, in that Indo-European context.
1. China and India on mind and world
Why did Bodhidharma go to China? This koan is an old one, and I am sure that the
answer I will give would disturb even the most realized roshi. I intend a very broadbrush
examination of the trajectory of Buddhist thought about the mind grounded in
Bodhidharma page 2
the hermeneutical principle that it is often best to read texts not simply against the
horizon of their composers and initial readers but against the horizon the tradition
they engender. In the present case I will argue that by looking at a surprising endpoint,
the Ch’an/Zen tradition in China and Japan, and in particular at the natural
reformulation of some Buddhist ideas about the philosophy of mind when Buddhism
entered China, we can see in sharper relief some of the conceptual innovation
towards which earlier Indian Buddhist philosophers were groping—innovations of
which it is fair to say they were not entirely aware. Buddhism from the start was
striving, I will argue for the transcendence of a representational model of thought,
and this required transcending Indian ways of thinking about thought.
As I say, in this essay I paint with a very broad brush indeed, and will not be pursuing
the close textual approach I favor. That will follow. The picture I am after, in its
broadest outlines is this: Buddhist philosophy of mind developed in an Indian milieu
in which many of the background assumptions about the relationship between
language, thought and the objects of language and thought are much like those that
inform most of Western philosophy. On the other hand, the outlook regarding the
self, the mind and the nature of knowledge that develops in the Buddhist tradition is
in important respects antithetical to that conceptual matrix. That antithesis makes it
hard for Buddhism to articulate its new vision, and results in a certain amount of
obscurity. On the other hand, when Buddhism enters China, it encounters a
conceptual matrix that is in some respects more conducive to its own vision of these
matters, and the translation of Buddhism into the Chinese language and conceptual
environment clarifies some of what Buddhist philosophers were attempting to say.
Here I am relying on Chad Hansen’s (1992) idea that there is a fundamental
difference between the way that Chinese philosophers saw the role of language in
human life and the way that Western philosophers see that role, as well as his view
that this difference entails a dramatic difference in the way in which the mind and
the explanation of behavior are conceived in the two traditions. Briefly (and
Bodhidharma page 3
dogmatically, for now—see Hansen’s book for the details) because the classical
Chinese scholars saw language principally as a written medium that could support
different pronunciations, in which the written characters directly represent the
world, they did not take representation to be the mode through which the mind
normally engages the world. Language, to use Hansen’s metaphor, on this
understanding, guides human behavior and itself represents the world. But
importantly, language on this view does not have the role of conveying, or of
representing thought, and the representational function is conceived as entirely
external—in the graphs—not internal to the mind. (Hansen 1992, pp 32-40)
As a consequence, classical Chinese thought as it was developed prior to the advent
of Buddhism in China, was preoccupied not with the relation between an inner and
an outer world, nor with the nature of mental states, nor with problems about truth
or the nature of reality. Instead the preoccupation was with the status of
Taos—guiding discourses. And a Tao is any sequence of graphs, from a single graph
to a lengthy text. There is no privileged unit of discourse such as a sentence. So
truth does not emerge as the major question to ask about texts. Rather the Chinese
tend to ask, are they successful or unsuccessful, constant or variable, universal or
relative? Minds and propositional attitudes, and in particular mental representations
are strikingly absent from Chinese philosophical discussion, as is logic or theory of
inference.
All of this suggests that Roger Ames’ maxim that the real divide between East and
West is not the Tigris or Euphrates, but the Himalayas has more than a grain of
truth. While Buddhist philosophy has a decidedly critical edge, and often sets itself
in sharp opposition to the tenets and frameworks of the orthodox Indian
philosophical schools, Buddhist philosophy as it developed on India and later in
Tibet was saturated with a broadly Indian (and hence a familiarly Indo-European)
way of taking up with the world: the sentence was the unit of discourse; truth was
Bodhidharma page 4
hence at center stage. Writing was important to be sure, but in classical India,
writing was phonetic, and was taken to represent speech, which in turn was taken to
express thought. This brought in train the view that linguistic meaning is parasitic
on that of thought, and that the mind’s relationship to the world is one of
representation. All of this forces questions about the accuracy of the mind’s
representation of the world, about the truth of ideas, about justification, and about
the relation of the mental to the physical. Does all of this sound familiar? Could this
be why Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy is such a comfortable step for those of us
who want to venture beyond our own tradition, while the East Asian traditions seem
a bit forbidding?
But herein lies the tension that intrigues me now: Buddhist thought, as I have
indicated, is self-consciously critical of that milieu, and often its critiques are
maddeningly obscure. I think that part of the reason for that is that the insights to
which Indian and Tibetan philosophers were trying to give voice were just too un-
Indian, too un-Tibetan to be expressed clearly in the available philosophical idioms.
We can see things improving as Bodhidharma goes East and finds a tradition coming
to the world with presuppositions surprisingly close to those of Buddhist high
theory.
2. Direct Perception and Inference
Buddhist epistemology, especially as it develops in the work of such figures as
Dharmak¥rti and Dignåga, but also as it emerges in the more refined work of the
Madhyamaka tradition as it assimilates their framework, draws a sharp distinction
between the status of the deliverances of perception and those of inference.
Perception, for Buddhist epistemologists, is a source of authoritative cognition, while
inference—while it might be a useful conventional instrument—is never fully
Bodhidharma page 5
authoritative. If I see a fire in the kitchen, I know that there is a fire in the kitchen; if
I see smoke, I may surmise, but do not know.
We must immediately temper and explain this claim. For it is well known to any
scholar of the epistemological tradition of Dignåga and Dharmak¥rti—the tradition
that dominates Buddhist epistemology both in India and in Tibet—that Buddhist
epistemologists accept two warrants for knowledge, viz., perception and inference.
By what warrant am I reducing that number to one? Let me be more precise: Indeed
inference is considered by Dignåga, Dharmak¥rti, and by the majority (though not
all) of their Tibetan exegetes and followers to be a source of authoritative cognition.
But it is considered authoritative for a very different reason and in a much more
limited sense than is perception. Perception is authoritative in this tradition because
it gives us access to real entities, and these will turn out to be particulars. And
perception is a warrant both for ordinary beings and for enlightened beings. More of
this below.
Inference, on the other hand, is a warrant despite the fact that its object—the
universal—is, for any Buddhist philosopher, non-existent, and despite the fact that
inference is always characterized as deceptive. The reason that inference is
countenanced as an epistemic warrant is simply that it is pragmatically useful; that
using it gets us to our epistemic goals and supports legitimate activity. It is never
taken to deliver the truth, and it must be abandoned by enlightened beings. It is very
much a second-rate patch to cover for the limitations on our perception. For this
reason it is fair to say that although each of perception and inference is authoritative
in some sense, only perception is authoritative in a full sense. (Dreyfus 1997, esp pp
299-315)
All of this hinges not on skeptical worries about the fallibility of inference, as one
might expect if one grew up on a diet of Western skepticism, but rather on a
nominalist construal of universals, and a theory of the role of universals as mediators
Bodhidharma page 6
of inference. One way of appreciating this point is that the withholding of full
authority to inference in this framework (despite important nods to its conventional
utility and indeed indispensability as a provisional tool for ordinary human beings,
including sophisticated philosophers) applies not only to inductive, but to deductive
inference as well. (Ibid., 142-153, Tillemans 1999, pp 117-150)
Consider the following inference: All produced phenomena are impermanent; this
pot is produced; therefore it is impermanent. Why is it a relatively defective way of
knowing the impermanence of the pot? Precisely because it depends upon the fact
that the universal of impermanence contains as a subordinate universal that of
produced phenomena; and that the universal of produced phenomena comprises,
inter alia, this pot. The logic is conceived of as categorical. If universals, and the
relations among them were real, as, for instance, many of the Indian Buddhists’
interlocutors, such as the Nyåya held, these inferences could count as fully
authoritative, for then one could in fact perceive the actual categorical relations that
mediate them. On the other hand, if these universals turn out not to be real, then of
course the relevant relations that mediate the inference in question are also unreal,
and hence cannot be perceived.
Universals, however, are all, from a Buddhist standpoint, unreal, for they are mere
conceptual, or linguistic imputations based upon the arbitrary aggregation of
particulars; they have no causal powers. We can quickly get into arcane doxography
here, as we worry about the status of particulars, and I would prefer not to. Some
Buddhist schools reject the independent status of particulars, while some take them
for granted. The general point remains: No matter what you think about the status
of particulars, from a Buddhist framework, universals are nonexistent in reality, and
the fact that they appear real to a mind performing inference means that they are
inherently deceptive, and hence can never mediate knowledge in the full sense.
Hence, whether inference is inductive or deductive, it can never be fully
Bodhidharma page 7
authoritative. At best it can be a useful expedient to guide worthwhile cognitive
activity.
The object of perception, on the other hand, according to all Buddhist
epistemologists, is particular. Hence, for veridical perception (and here again, to get
things precise, an extensive doxographic interlude would be necessary), there is in
fact a genuine object of perception contact with which guarantees the epistemic
authority of the cognitive state. Andindeed, a Buddha sees the particular impermance
of thepot.
It is important to see just how restrictive this standard of highest epistemic authority
is: Particulars are momentary. Continua, including continua of mind or of physical
objects, are, strictly speaking, universals comprising innumerable particular
moments. They are never perceived. This is why so much of our ordinary
experience is deceptive according to this philosophical framework. We think that we
see enduring pots, tables and human beings. But inasmuch as there are no such
things, we are deceived. On the other hand, we do authoritatively perceive moments
of such things. We just don’t know it; typically, for those of us who are not fully
enlightened, the experience to which we have access fails to be truly authoritative;
our truly authoritative experience is beyond our access. We go through life believing
that we are perceiving when in fact we are inferring.
What, then, do we make of the extensive Buddhist literature on inference, and on the
extensive use of principles of logical inference in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist literature?
Here we enter the realm of upåya—of skilful means—in its epistemological home.
Some of us are not fully enlightened. We need a ladder to get us to that stage where
our knowledge is all constituted by direct perception of reality. That ladder is
inference. Through inference we can cultivate a preliminary understanding of the
character of the object of enlightened direct perception. Then we’ll know it when
we see it, instead of being deceived into believing that we are seeing the real thing
Bodhidharma page 8
when in fact we are fabricating it through conception. For this reason, despite its
ultimately deceptive character, inference properly performed is a necessary expedient
on the path, but an expedient that, like the raft, is to be discarded when it serves the
purpose of leading us to the ground of direct perception. And, just as when one is
choosing a ladder or a raft, it is essential—even if the tool will be but a temporary
expedient—to be able to tell the difference between a sound and a shaky ladder or
between a seaworthy and a leaky raft, it is essential in doing philosophy to be able to
tell the difference between valid and invalid inference.
Thus we see an initial epistemic tension built into the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist
epistemological framework: a theory of inference is needed to sort out invalid from
valid inference; the only candidate theory is a categorical logic that is indeed
embraced. But the categorical logic in turn runs afoul of Buddhist ontology, and
must ultimately be rejected. The grounds for its rejection are inferential, and that
inference must be rejected. Epistemic consistency is difficult to achieve. But we see
Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophers groping—beginning with an
epistemology that takes for granted an account of the meaningfulness and utility of
inference and of general terms that demands either universals or linguistic
devices—for some way both to transcend those demands, and to justify their
transcendence using those very devices. Bodhidharma could be forgiven a bit of
perplexity.
3. Non-conceptual thought vs conceptual thought
Parallel motivations and tensions emerge when we examine Buddhist critiques of
conceptuality. Repeatedly in Mahåyåna literature we encounter admonitions that
conceptual thought fabricates its objects; that it falsifies reality. The cognitive states
of enlightened beings are regularly contrasted with those of unenlightened beings
along this axis: we unenlightened beings conceptualize, and thus fabricate, or falsify
Bodhidharma page 9
our objects. The insight of buddhas is non-conceptual. What does this mean, and
why is it so important?
I think the key word here is fabrication. (prapañca, spros pa) Buddhist epistemology is
grounded in the idea that the goal of epistemic practice is the realization of truth,
and truth is a correspondence between the knowing cognitive state and the object it
knows. The immediate object of conceptual thought is always, as we have seen, a
universal, an aspect under which something is conceived. To put the point in
contemporary epistemological terms, for an unenlightened being, seeing is always
seeing-as. But to see-as is to see falsely—to assign a character to the object of
thought that it must lack, precisely because no such characteristics are found in
reality.
But Buddhas know things. After all, they are omniscient. So they must know nonconceptually,
and indeed this is how their knowledge is characterized in all Buddhist
treatises on the subject. But omniscience requires that they know all objects of
knowledge, including the epistemic states of unenlightened sentient beings. That,
after all, is a prerequisite for their compassionate and skilful intervention in order to
facilitate the enlightenment of all sentient beings. But that requires that they know
that p, for all true p, and that means that they must know that things are... are, what?
Here is the second major tension. For Indian and Tibetan epistemology,
developing in the orthodox matrix of Sanskritic thought, the proper content of
knowledge claims are propositions, and a proposition consists in the attribution of a
property to an object or sequence of objects; and it is hard to see how that can be
done without appeal to concepts, and hence to universals. But Buddhas must be able
to do so. And so we end up with a rhetoric of inconceivability when we look for any
account of the immediate, non-conceptual knowledge of matters of fact. And of
course this is doubly unsatisfactory, for here the enterprise is simply to characterize
conceptually, for beings like us, what our own epistemic goal is. But unlike the case
Bodhidharma page 10
with perception vs inference, we can’t even claim that our cognitive activity can
present us with an indirect grasp of its own goal. Not only can a Buddha not say
directly what he knows, but we cannot even say indirectly what he knows, or what we
are trying to achieve. We can begin to see why Bodhidharma may have been
consulting a travel agent.
4. Non-duality and duality
Closely connected to these issues is the distinction we find throughout Madhyamaka
and Yogåcåra texts on the philosophy of mind and epistemology between dualistic
and non-dualistic awareness. Again, this distinction divides mundane from
enlightened consciousness. Ordinary minds cognize their objects dualistically,
distinguishing subject from object, object from its complement in the objective
domain, and characterized basis from characteristic. The mind of an enlightened
being is free from these dualistic appearances. A buddha’s mind does not represent
the object as distinct from itself; a buddha’s mind does not represent objects as
distinct from all else—that is, it does not objectify; a buddha’s mind does not
distinguish characterized from characteristic.
We can see why this must be so, and so we can trace both the roots of and the nature
of the error embodied by dualistic awareness as it is understood from this
perspective. Once again, we can, if we wish, distinguish a number of different
approaches taken to spelling out the nature of these dualities in various Buddhist
philosophical systems. But in the end, the major contours will be congruent enough
for present purposes. The key term here is objectification (dmigs pa, ålambana). When
we ordinary folk see a pot we take the object of our consciousness to be a thing that
exists externally to our mind, and that to be a relatively enduring thing, cognized by
a mental episode whose temporal duration might be quite brief, and whose
fundamental nature is very different (mental, vs physical, for instance, hence the
Bodhidharma page 11
distinction between it and me. (We also, on this view, objectify the self, and the same
story could be told from the subjective side). In fact, the pot we see is a momentary
pot stage; and in fact, we see it as a continuing pot. But that is a purely psychological
construct, and so exists not externally to us, but in our minds. The basis of the
distinction we draw vanishes on this view. A buddha, objectifying neither pot nor
self, merely is aware (non-conceptually, of course) of a momentary pot-stage in a
moment of pot-perception.
We distinguish the pot from the cloth on which it rests. That distinction is drawn
on the grounds that the pot and the cloth are different kinds of things—that they are
distinct continua. But neither continuum has any independent reality, and any joints
at which we carve the world we experience depend upon the application of falsifying
concepts. So such dualities are illusory. This is not to say that the buddha sees a
seamless reality—this is not some kind of mystical monism—rather that among the
myriad particulars, no kinds appear to a buddha as more than merely conventional.
We say that the pot is blue. When we do so, we distinguish the particular pot from
the universal blueness that it instantiates. That is, after all, the basis on which we can
cognize, and utter, the conventional truth, “this pot is blue.” But upon analysis, we
have a hard time maintaining this distinction. The pot cannot be posited coherently
as a bare particular; the universal cannot be discovered apart from its instances. Part
of what it is to be this pot is to be this instance of blueness; part of what it is to be blue is
to be the color of this pot. That non-duality is non-dually cognized by a Buddha.
All of this is orthodoxy, and to anyone who has spent time on Buddhist
epistemology, these points are pedestrian. Nonetheless, none of it is easy to say, or
to make coherent. What does it really mean for a mind to be one with its object; for
a thing to be one with its complement; for a particular to be one with a universal
(especially for an existent particular to be one with a non-existent universal)? It is no
wonder that in the Vimalak¥rti-nirdeßa-s¨tra, when Mañjußr¥ is asked to comment on
Bodhidharma page 12
the many bodhisattva’s accounts of the nature of non-duality he faults them all for
trying to express the inexpressible, and less wonder that Vimilak¥rti, when asked to
comment on that comments, remains silent. Silence on this matter is recommended.
But the recommendation is far from silent. The tensions mount. Bodhidharma
books a place in a caravan.
5. Awareness vs representation
Let us consider one last slice between benighted and awakened consciousness, that
between the non-representational awareness of a Buddha and the representations of
an ordinary being. This dichotomy is often used to explain all of the rest we have
scouted; and it will provide, I think, a way to understand the insights Buddhist
philosophy of mind is striving to articulate in India and Tibet, as well as the reasons
for the difficulties in articulating them. It will also provide the pivot point for seeing
why these insights were more available, and perhaps even prosaic, to Chinese
appropriators of Buddhism and those they in turn influenced.
The world of ordinary experience is often characterized in this literature as
conditioned by representations, (rnam pa, åkåra; tshad nyid, nimitta) and the world of
a buddha, by contrast, as beyond representation. The point is straightforward, and
indeed is revolutionary in Indian philosophical thought. It is even difficult for some
Western philosophers to wrap their minds around, though it is gaining a certain
currency in these post-modern times. When ordinary beings perceive or conceive
the world, we do so, on this view, through the mediation of mental episodes or
processes that are representational in character. These episodes take reality and represent
it; our minds engage directly with these mediating representations, and not
with the representeds. The representations are taken to be real, to be external, to be
mind-independent; but they are not, and they veil the real objects from the mind.
Bodhidharma page 13
This representational theory of mind and the problems it raises should sound
familiar, but there are, as we have seen, a few twists. While mediation, per se, is a
problem in the Indian and Tibetan context, as it is in early modern Western
philosophy, in the Indian context, it is precisely the fact that this mediation is
conceptual that is taken as problematic, for the concepts come from the subjective
side, and it is taken that no representation is possible without conceptualization. But
the other side of the coin is this: while most early modern philosophers, despite the
concern for the distorting or distancing potential of a mediate view of access to the
world reckoned this an inescapable predicament of cognition, Indo-Tibetan
Buddhist philosophers regard it as a soluble predicament. Since a buddha sees reality
as it is, and since that is impossible through representation, a buddha has nonrepresentational
cognition.
And so we are back to conundrum. For despite the repeated scriptural assurances
that reality is beyond representation, and that an enlightened cognition of reality is
non-representational, there is no account of just what non-representational cognitive
access to anything could be. This, of course, is not surprising. For from the
standpoint of Indian or Tibetan Buddhist philosophers, thought is a paradigm of the
representational. For that which is beyond representation to be conceivable would
be straightforwardly contradictory.
6. Transformation of the basis
Buddhist soteriological concerns reflect the tensions we have been exploring. By the
Fifth Century of the Common Era, well into the heyday of Mahåyåna philosophical
activity, Vasubandhu and his brother Asanga, at least with the mediation of
Sthiramati a century or so later, launched the Yogåcåra movement. This idealist
Buddhist philosophical system can best be seen, as refracted by the current sets of
concerns, as an attempt both to resolve some of the apparent paradoxes of
Bodhidharma page 14
Madhyamaka metaphysics through the application of the logic and epistemology
developing through the interaction of Buddhist and orthodox Indian schools, and to
develop an account of practice and soteriology that could make sense of the path
from ordinary cognition and subjectivity to the subjectivity and epistemic states of a
buddha.
The advent of Yogåcåra, at the very time when Buddhism was being carried into
China, marks an intriguing moment in the forked history of Buddhist philosophy. In
India, an extended debate began, sparked by Candrak¥rti’s Madhyamaka reply to
Yogåcåra, between the two schools. This debate and the subsequent doxography,
defines the landscape of Tibetan Buddhist scholarship and its philosophical and
hermeneutical problematic when Buddhism crossed the Himalaya into Tibet
beginning in the Ninth Century. On the other hand, as Buddhism moved north
into China well before these debates crystallized, Madhyamaka and Yogåcåra were
seen in China not as rival philosophical schools, but as complementary aspects of a
unified philosophical viewpoint. So, while in India and Tibet, Yogåcåra and its
approach to these problems was eventually denigrated as a second-best
framework—what to do until one is mature enough to tolerate the depth and
paradox of Madhyamaka—in China, and subsequently in the East Asian traditions
that originate in China, such as those of Korea and Japan, Yogåcåra ideas flourished
and took center stage as complementary to and as consistent with Madhyamaka
(again, there is much more nuance to this doctrinal history than I am acknowledging
here, but this is close enough to right for present purposes).
Here we must be content to note a few salient features of the Yogåcåra metaphysics,
epistemology and soteriology necessary for present purposes. First, all phenomena
have three natures: At the coarsest level, they have an imagined nature; their nature
as they are imagined to be by ordinary people. That imagined nature includes their
character as existing external to the mind in space and time, and their being distinct
Bodhidharma page 15
from—that is dual, with respect to—the mind. These properties are, however,
according to this idealist school, imaginary. Second, phenomena have a dependent
nature. That is, phenomena exist only in dependence upon the mind—they are,
from this perspective, real things, but their reality is the reality of hallucinations,
things that exist only in dependence upon the mind. Realization of this nature is, of
course, a more advanced cognitive state that which only takes things as they are
imagined to be. Third, and finally, things have a consummate nature, the nature they
are seen to have form the standpoint of enlightened awareness. This is their nature as
non-different from the mind, usually put as the fact that the dependent—that is the
hallucinatory—is empty of the imagined—that is, of external reality. When one sees
the consummate nature of things, one sees that all is mental, subject-object duality
vanishes, and with it conceptualization and representation. From the metaphysical
side, the Yogåcåra argue that all things have these three natures; from the
epistemological side, the goal of practice is to realize the consummate.
Before we leave the three natures for other central features of the Yogåcåra vision
that prove so influential in Chinese Mahåyåna, it is important to focus for a moment
in the special role of the second of these three natures—the dependent. It has a dual
character, facing on the one hand the imagined, and on the other the consummate.
It hence plays an important pivot role from the standpoint of ontology, epistemology
and soteriology. On the one hand, the dependent nature is dualistic: the fact that
external phenomena are dependent on my own mind requires the distinction
between the hallucination that is my cognitive object and the mind that is its subject;
on the other hand, once the distinction between subject and object is drawn within
the domain of the dependent, that very duality collapses into the unity that is a mind
comprising a mental process. On the one hand, when I come to understand the
dependent character of phenomena, I come to see them as representations of which I
am aware, knowing them as objects, and myself as subject; on the other hand, when I
know them in this way, I know them as aspects of my own mind, and duality and
Bodhidharma page 16
representation vanish. On the one hand, to have realized the dependent is to have
realized yet another conventional aspect of phenomena, one shot through with
representation, conceptual thought, duality, etc; on the other, since it is true that all
phenomena have this character, unlike the imagined, and since the consummate just
is the absence of imagined in the dependent; to have understood the dependent is
already an aspect of enlightened consciousness. This special role of the middle
nature is hence central to understanding the Yogåcåra analysis of the possibility of
the transcendence of the mundane.
The second important Yogåcåra innovation is the reconstruction of the Madhyamaka
notion of emptiness. While for Någårjuna and his followers, the ultimate truth
about phenomena is their emptiness of essence—a fact that grounds their
transcendence of conceptual thought—for the Yogåcåra their emptiness is simply
their emptiness of subject-object duality, and the emptiness of the dependent nature
of the imagined. Realization of ultimate truth is hence realization of consummate
nature, and that in turn, as we have seen, is an aspect of the realization of the
dependent. This reconfiguration of emptiness has profound implications, and is a
crucial part of the Yogåcåra solution to the Madhyamaka paradoxes. It replaces the
notion of essencelessness with an analysis in terms of several essences, and hence
replaces a problem about how we can know objects that ultimately do not exist with a
problem about how we can know objects that exist ultimately in ways other than that
in which they appear to exist. A gulf that the Yogåcårins may well have seen as
unbridgeable within the framework of Madhyamaka becomes more tractable when
seen as akin to far more familiar appearance-reality problem.
A third conceptual innovation in Yogåcåra is the introduction of a foundation
consciousness or transcendental subjectivity that underlies all experience, including
introspective experience of the evolving and constantly changing stream of mental
episodes and processes, from which it is distinguished. This foundation forms the
Bodhidharma page 17
basis of all awareness, personal identity, the preservation of memory, the
accumulation of karma, etc. It is always subject and never object. In empirical selfconsciousness,
according to Yogåcårins, even our own awareness of ourselves is
dualistic, with the foundation consciousness acting as subject, and the stream of
mental events as object. The empirical mind is as subject to three-nature theory as
any other empirical object, and is equally imaginary, dependent, and ultimately nondually
related to the foundation consciousness.
The foundation consciousness is in many ways the central philosophical innovation
of this tradition. While madhyamaka philosophers in India and Tibet criticize it
savagely as a return to the substantial self or åtman of the orthodox Indian schools,
the Yogåcårins and those in East Asia who assimilated their doctrines treated it as a
necessary posit in order to solve a host of problems, including those we have in front
of us. Why do we see things erroneously? Potentials carried by the foundation
consciousness? Why does the past determine the future? Potentials carried by the
foundation consciousness? Why can we transform our awareness? Potentials carried
by the foundation consciousness. Why do we have any experience at all? The
nature of the foundation consciousness is pure subjectivity.
But there is a world of difference between the experience of a deluded, defiled
foundation consciousness and that of a buddha, and our whole problem has been to
explain what that difference is, and how to get from here to there. And here the
Yogåcårins introduce a further important conceptual construct—the transformation
of the basis. The idea is this: so long as karmic potentials reside in the foundation
consciousness, they will ripen in the form of conscious experience, which experience
will be ineliminably representational, conceptual, dualistic, deluded. But through
hard practice, including not only proper conduct whose purpose is to purge these
potentials, but also the cultivation of an awareness of the three natures, and hence a
conceptual apprehension of the falsity of experience and of the true nature of reality,
Bodhidharma page 18
these potentials can be exhausted. At that point, there is a fundamental
transformation of the nature of the foundation consciousness. It is no longer the
repository of the potential for representation. But its nature as pure subjectivity
remains, despite its having no objects. Since all objects are illusory, a consciousness
without objects is an accurate consciousness, but one of a different order—a nonrepresentational
consciousness immediately aware of the fundamental nature of
reality. And that is enlightenment.
This allows us to approach the fourth and final conceptual innovation in this
idealistic system, one that was a kind of footnote to Buddhist philosophy in India, but
which assumed a central place in China and indeed in certain Tibetan schools—the
idea of Buddha-nature, or the innate potential for enlightenment, often referred to as
the seed or matrix of Buddhahood. The very nature of the foundation consciousness
is pure subjectivity. Its objects, we have seen, are, while illusory, adventitious. Since
they are adventitious, they can be eliminated. Their elimination is the achievement
of buddhahood. We hence all have the seed of buddhahood in us at the start. This is
our buddha-nature. Most radically, this is put as the fact that all sentient beings are
primordially enlightened, but this fact is occluded by the ignorance we have been
surveying. The achievement of buddhahood is not so much a transformation as a
recovery or rediscovery of that which is already present.
Here is another way to put this surprising point: Buddhahood is the elimination of
all error and all conditioned ignorance. Error is the mistaking of that which is
nondually related to the mind for dualistically perceived objects, or the
superimposition of conceptual construction on that which is in its own nature
unconceptualized. We erroneously take the minds we experience in introspection
and the object of perception and ideation to be real, and the latter to be distinct from
the former, which we take to be their subjects. All of that, though, is wrong; our
genuine experience is merely the subjectivity of our foundation consciousness, which
is by nature non-dual, non-conceptual, non-representational. We just don’t know it.
Bodhidharma page 19
When we recognize that fact and experience ourselves through that recognition, we
recognize our own enlightenment.
All of this Yogåcåra theory of experience and reality is meant to provide a cogent
account of the insights that are so difficult to capture from a Madhyamaka
perspective: inference is delusional precisely because inference always proceeds
through representations, and representations always mediate between a subject and
on object; inasmuch as all objects are illusory, all representation is misrepresentation,
and so all inference misleading. Perception requires a slightly
different treatment for a Yogåcåra. We need here to distinguish between perception
contaminated by dualistic representation—the perception that ordinary deluded folks
like us experience—and perception that is free from it. The point is that what is
generally taken for perception is not purely perceptual at all, but is conceptualized
and mediated. True perception is immediate, nonconceptual, non-dual. Once again,
the deeper point that the Yogåcåra are after is that in reality our perceptual
experience is already like that. We just don’t allow ourselves to know it.
As I noted, in India and Tibet, this system was regarded by most Buddhist
philosophers as only a stepping stone to a more profound view. We can see why.
For one thing, there is the reinstatement of a foundation consciousness that appears
to function as a non-empty self; for another, the madhyamaka insistence on the
reality of the conventional world seems to be undermined by the Yogåcåra idealism.
And for another, ordinary perception loses is status as authoritative. (Though this
point, again, must be made with some delicacy, given the close association of
Dharmak¥rti’s epistemology that in fact privileges the authority of perception with
Yogåcåra metaphysics. Exploring this Madhyamaka critique would, however, take as
far afield.)
A deeper reason for Madhyamaka dissatisfaction with Yogåcåra epistemology in
India and Tibet, however, is this: it appears that the central idea that our awareness is
Bodhidharma page 20
already genuinely non-conceptual, non-dual, non-representational was inconceivable
to a paradigmatically Indian way of understanding human experience. The whole
problematic of Indian epistemology—Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike—was to
understand how it is that our inner mental states can afford knowledge of the world,
and to determine how our concepts could grasp a world that from its side is
nonconceptual. So, Bodhidharma simply had to go elsewhere.
7. Not thinking, thinking, without-thinking
When the Mahåyåna went East, it was thus a system that incorporated not only the
problematic of Madhyamaka and its relentlessly analytic approach to understanding
reality, but also the idealistic phenomenology of Yogåcåra and its fumbling towards a
solution to the problems that appeared insoluble within the Madhyamaka
framework. But when it hit China, suddenly these problems are transformed. As we
have seen, Buddhist philosophy was striving for something that within the Indian
framework was radical indeed: a total transformation of thinking about the
relationship between mind and world, and indeed about the nature of mind and
world themselves; a replacement of the orthodox model of an independent,
continuous knower of an independent, continuous known, with knowledge achieved
through the mediation of a set of representations with a model of direct, non-dual
apprehension of an essenceless, constantly changing reality by an essenceless
constantly changing continuum of mental states. The problem was that while
Buddhist philosophers had this revolution in mind, the very framework they were
striving to transcend made the formulation of the transcendence difficult.
But Chinese thinkers never thought of the relation between knower and object in
such representational terms. For them, the function of language was captured by the
notion of a Tao—a guiding discourse; the relevant evaluative categories for language
and for thought were effectiveness vs ineffectiveness, constancy vs inconstancy (both
Bodhidharma page 21
culturally and temporally), not truth vs falsity. The problems that concerned them
were problems about the justification of choice of Tao. Buddhism emerged as a
foreign Tao from the West, and at that a most peculiar one. Indeed when we look at
the Chinese assimilation of Buddhism we are struck by the difficulty of translating
Sanskrit texts and Sanskrit ideas into Chinese, and the degree to which the Buddhist
critique of orthodoxy in India comes to look like the Taoist critique of Confucian
orthodoxy. This is sometimes represented as a distortion of Buddhism as it is
Sinified. But we might tell a different story.
Chinese Buddhist philosophers certainly assumed the preoccupation of Buddhist
philosophy of mind and epistemology with the role of signs in mediating
engagement with the world. This, as I have been emphasizing, is a central concern
of classical Chinese philosophy as much as it is a concern of classical Indian
philosophy, even though the specific model of mediation is very different. And
Chinese Buddhist philosophers agreed with their Indian progenitors that a critique
of that mediation is necessary—that immediate experience is to be preferred to
mediated experience. But of course their reasons were different. The concern in
China was that every Tao—even a Buddhist Tao—is conventional, arbitrary,
constricting; that the world and effective engagement in it is too complex, too
variable, requires too much spontaneity of the virtuoso human, to be captured in a
finite Tao—a discourse of signs. Taoist and Chinese Buddhist philosophers agreed
that while this much could be stated by a Tao, any Tao, like any raft, must be
discarded if life is to be lived appropriately.
Now, here, too, is a paradox: as L’ao Tzu put it, no speakable Tao is a constant Tao.
[I] Even this one. And Chinese Buddhist thinkers, particularly in the Ch’an tradition,
were happy to adopt this paradox. The Vajracchedikåprajñåpåramitå-s¨tra, which was
so influential in Ch’an Buddhism, and so celebrated by Hui Neng, after all, happily
tells us that all “truth is uncontainable and inexpressible,” [7] presumably including
Bodhidharma page 22
this one. The second chapter of Tao Te Ching emphasizes the artificiality, relativity
and unreality of conceptual categories, as does the ninth chapter of the Platform
Sutra. Five colors make one blind; five tones deaf. And the pursuit of Tao, unlike
that of learning, requires decrease day by day. The Vajracchedikåprajñåpåramitå also
tells us that “bodhisattvas should leave behind all phenomenal distinctions and
awaken... by not allowing the mind to depend on notions evoked by sounds, odors,
flavors, touch or any qualities...” [14] Now the Vajracchedika, to be sure, is an Indian
text. But it is a text that had curiously little influence in India. Its real blossoming as
an important text in the Buddhist tradition occurs when it is transmitted to China
and taken up by Hui Neng in the Platform S¨tra.
But while there is an air of paradox about all of this, there is, we must acknowledge,
greater clarity about just what this self-undermining discourse is doing than could be
achieved in the Indian context: Our Buddha-nature, the seed of enlightenment
within each of this, on this view, lies in the fact that the precondition of our
following any system of signs is something beyond signs—a capacity for spontaneous
engagement that must lie within our mind as we learn signs, on pain of regress.
This, as Tsung Mi would put it is root; all of the signs; all of our conceptual activity
is mere branch. Awakening is a return to the root, not so much through a pruning of
the branches, but through a recognition of their secondary status. (Gregory 1995, p
67)
As we learn signs—as we are socialized into concepts—these come to mediate our
experience by guiding us, constricting our range of cognitive possibilities even as they
makes others possible. We come to see the world in terms of them—superimposing
a conceptual structure over a reality that is not inherently conceptualized. In doing
so, we create a subject-object dichotomy that places us on one side of the guiding
discourse, and the objects to which it is directed on the other. No mystery there. But
how are we to conceptualize liberation? And how, as Tsung-Mi, was to ask, can we
Bodhidharma page 23
solve what Peter Gregory has called the Buddhist problem of theodicy—the problem
concerning how we can be deluded if we are primordially enlightened, and how, if
delusion is part of the nature of a sentient being, we can eliminate it. (Ibid. 196)
Here is the Ch’an innovation: the distinction between action with no thinking,
action with thinking, and action without thinking. As Døgen puts it, “to study the
dharma is to study the self; to study the self is to forget the self; to forget the self is to
be actualized by all things.” (GenjØkØan 4) This device enables the mysteries and
obscurities of the Indian Mahåyåna to be shed. When we first approach a new
domain, we do not know how to think about it. We act ignorantly and ineffectively
because we act with no thinking: we have no Tao, no signs, to guide us. This is not
enlightened action; it is not even action acceptable at a mundane level. By learning a
guiding discourse, we come to learn a way of acting. But when we act through this
kind of explicit guidance, our actions will be, while generally correct and effective,
hardly expert. They will be studied, restricted. As we gain expertise and practice, we
can leave the discourse behind, we can improvise, and attain the spontaneity in a
domain that is the goal of practice. This sequence is familiar to anyone who has
mastered a language, an art, a sport, a skill. And this is the metaphor that guides
much Chinese theory about the transcendence of language.
Nothing in this picture is, strictly speaking, antithetical to the Indian Buddhist
theory that preceded it. Indeed, I think that it represents a startling completion of
the project begun in India. But note the enormous difference. Here the story can be
told shorn of worries about the status of universals; shorn of a representational
model of mind; shorn of worries about the reality of subject and object. The
intuition that a truly enlightened way of engaging with the world both requires the
use of language and its transcendence is vindicated in a way that also reveals the
insight that a representational model of subjectivity was wrong all along. But
Bodhidharma page 24
because that model was never presupposed in the first place, the road is smoother
and the paradoxes less daunting.
We can also see why Yogåcåra ideas that seem a bit mad in the Indian context seem
prosaic in the Chinese context: The transformation of the basis is simply the
transcendence of the need for a recipe; the imagined nature is the nature that things
have according to any Tao taken as definitive, a focus on the branch as primary; their
dependent nature is the fact that any character they are experienced as having
depends on some Tao—some framework—and seeing that these things are so
dependent on our conventions allows us to transcend those conventions and to see
things as consummated, to return to the root. When we do that, we transcend signs,
we transcend objectification, and we do not experience ourselves as subjects opposed
to our objects. This is the immediacy of experience in the context of effective
perception and action that constitutes liberation, the affirmation by all things
because of our effective, practiced engagement with them.
And of course in a perfectly ordinary sense this kind of engagement is perceptual, not
inferential, and so, from a revised Indian Buddhist perspective, driven by
authoritative, rather than by deluded, or obscured, cognition; it is not mediated by
representations, but rather direct; it is non-dual. All of these desiderata so hard to
articulate from within the Indian context fall out very nicely when the role of
language and of signs is seen from the Chinese perspective.
8. Selflessness and the reworking of the narrative of consciousness
A central tenet of Buddhist philosophy is that there is no self. This doctrine is
generally and most directly interpreted as the thesis that there is no substantial ego
underlying our experience—that we are nothing but a sequence of causally linked
psychological and physical events and processes. And this is both highly plausible
and an important contribution of Buddhist philosophy. But the current investigation
Bodhidharma page 25
allows us to push the doctrine of no-self even further. To be sure, the ontological
dimension of self that is the target of this idea is the substantial ego. But there is also
an epistemological dimension, and this dimension is also illuminated as we look at
the Indian Buddhist critique of the self from the vantagepoint of the East.
One way of contrasting the belief in a self with the attitude of selflessness s is in
terms of self-awareness, or as it is put in the Buddhist tradition, self-grasping. In this
sense to have a self is simply to grasp oneself as an entity, as a subject standing
opposed to an object. So in an important sense the goal of the realization of
selflessness can be conceived as the goal of achieving a state of consciousness in
which the awareness of oneself as a distinct subject no longer figures. Non-duality in
this sense is simply non-dual awareness, that is, action without-thinking. Just as
action without thinking is an achievement depending on prior thought, selflessness
in this sense is an achievement depending on careful cultivation of self.
We hence see a reconfiguring of the entire narrative of self-consciousness when
Buddhism moves to East Asia, but a reconfiguration that represents not so much a
deviation from the trajectory of Buddhist thought in India and Tibet; rather it is a
completion of that trajectory that would have been difficult or impossible in the
Indo-Tibetan context. For in order to complete the Buddhist response to the Indian
representational, conceptual account of epistemic subjectivity and action it was
necessary to find a way of talking about subjectivity and action that never
presupposed that very paradigm as a background, a way of talking about subjectivity
in which representation and conception are not seen as inextricable from even
relatively normal cognition, and in which language is seen ab initio as an external
guiding device. And that required Bodhidharma to travel to the East. The flip side
of this record, of course, is that given this conceptual milieu, the problematic of
Buddhist philosophy could never have originated in China. The right puzzles would
Bodhidharma page 26
never have risen to salience. For Buddhism to come to China, Bodhidharma had to
come from the West.
Bodhidharma page 27
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